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Abstract
In this paper a class of languages which are formal enough for mathematical reasoning
is introduced. First-order formal languages containing natural numbers and numerals
belong to that class. Its languages are called mathematically agreeable (shortly MA).
Languages containing a given MA language L, and being sublanguages of L augmented
by a monadic predicate, are constructed. A mathematical theory of truth (shortly
MTT) is formulated for some of these languages. MTT makes them MA languages
which posses their own truth predicates. MTT is shown to conform well with the eight
norms presented for theories of truth in the paper ‘What Theories of Truth Should
be Like (but Cannot be)’, by Hannes Leitgeb. MTT is also free from infinite regress,
providing a proper framework to study the regress problem. Main tools used in proofs
are Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory and classical logic.
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1
1 Introduction
In this paper a theory of truth is formulated for a class of languages. The regress problem is
studied within the framework of that theory.
A language L is called mathematically agreeable (shortly MA), if it satisfies the following
three conditions.
(i) L contains a countable syntax of the first-order predicate logic with equality (cf., e.g., [17,
Definitions II.5.1–5.2.6]), natural numbers in variables and their names, numerals in terms.
(ii) L is fully interpreted, i.e., every sentence of L is interpreted either as true or as false.
(iii) Classical truth tables (cf. e.g., [17], p.3) are valid for the logical connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, →
and↔ of sentences of L, and classical rules of truth hold for applications of quantifiers ∀ and
∃ to formulas of L.
These properties ensure that every MA language is formal enough for mathematical reasoning.
Any countable first-order formal language, equipped with a consistent theory interpreted by
a countable model, and containing natural numbers and numerals, is an MA language. A
classical example is the language of arithmetic with its standard model and interpretation.
Basic ingredients of the present approach are:
1. An MA language L (base language).
2. A monadic predicate T having the set X of numerals as its domain of discourse.
3. The language L, which has sentences of L, T (n), n ∈ X , ∀xT (x) and ∃xT (x) as its basic
sentences, and which is closed under logical connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, → and ↔.
4. The set D of Go¨del numbers of sentences of L in its fixed Go¨del numbering.
The paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we construct to each subset U of D new subsets G(U) and F (U) of D. Let LU
be the language of the sentences whose Go¨del numbers are in G(U) ∪ F (U). It contains L.
In Section 3 results on the existence and construction of consistent fixed points of G, i.e.
consistent sets satisfying U = G(U), including the smallest one, are presented. U is called
consistent if for no sentence A of L the Go¨del numbers of both A and ¬A are in U .
In Section 4 a mathematical theory of truth (shortly MTT) is defined for languages LU ,
where U is a consistent fixed point of G. A sentence A of LU is interpreted as true if its Go¨del
number #A is in G(U), and as false if #A is in F (U). This makes LU an MA language. T is
called a truth predicate for LU . Biconditionality: A↔ T (⌈A⌉), where ⌈A⌉ is the numeral of
the Go¨del number of A, is shown to be true for all sentences A of LU . Since both L and LU
are fully interpreted, their sentences are either true or false. Moreover, a sentence A of L is
either true or false in the interpretation of L if and only if A is either true or false in LU .
Section 5 is devoted to the study of the regress problem within the framework of MTT. We
present an example of an infinite regress (parade) of justifications that satisfies the conditions
imposed on them in [22]. Example is inconsistent with the following conclusion stated in [23]:
“it is logically impossible for there to be an infinite parade of justifications”. That conclusion
is used in [22, 23] as a basic argument to refute Principles of Sufficient Reasons.
In Section 6 we shall first introduce some benefits of MTT compared with some other theories
of truth. The lack of Liar-like sentences makes MTT mathematically acceptable. MTT is
shown to conform well with the eight norms presented in [18] for theories of truth. Connections
of obtained results to mathematical philosophy and epistemology are also presented.
2
2 Construction of languages
Let basic ingredients L, T , L and D be as in the Introduction. We shall construct a family
of sublanguages for the language L. As for the used terminology, cf. e.g., [17]. Let U be a
subset of D. Define subsets G(U) and F (U) of D by following rules, which are similar to
those presented in [11] (’iff’ abbreviates ’if and only if’):
(r1) If A is a sentence of L, then the Go¨del number #A of A is in G(U) iff A is true in the
interpretation of L, and in F (U) iff A is false in the interpretation of L.
(r2) Let n be a numeral. T (n) is in G(U) iff n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #A
is in U . T (n) is in F (U) iff n = ⌈A⌉, where A is a sentence of L and #[¬A] is in U .
Sentences determined by rules (r1) and (r2), i.e., all sentences A of L and those sentences
T (⌈A⌉) of L for which #A or #[¬A] is in U , are called basic sentences.
Next rules deal with logical connectives. Let A and B be sentences of L.
(r3) Negation rule: #[¬A] is in G(U) iff #A is in F (U), and in F (U) iff #A is in G(U).
(r4) Disjunction rule: #[A ∨ B] is in G(U) iff #A or #B is in G(U), and in F (U) iff #A
and #B are in F (U).
(r5) Conjunction rule: #[A ∧B] is in G(U) iff #[¬A ∨¬B] is in F (U) iff (by (r3) and (r4))
both #A and #B are in G(U). Similarly, #[A ∧ B] is in F (U) iff #[¬A ∨ ¬B] is in
G(U) iff #A or #B is in F (U).
(r6) Implication rule: #[A → B] is in G(U) iff #[¬A ∨ B] is in G(U) iff (by (r3) and (r4))
#A is in F (U) or #B is in G(U). #[A → B] is in F (U) iff #[¬A ∨ B] is in F (U) iff
#A is in G(U) and #B is in F (U).
(r7) Biconditionality rule: #[A ↔ B] is in G(U) iff #A and #B are both in G(U) or both
in F (U), and in F (U) iff #A is in G(U) and #B is in F (U) or #A is in F (U) and #B
is in G(U).
Rule (r1) is applicable for sentences of L formed by applications of universal and existential
quantifiers to formulas of L. Thus it suffices to set rules for ∃xT (x) and ∀xT (x).
(r8) #[∃xT (x)] is in G(U) iff #T (n) is in G(U) for some numeral n. #[∃xT (x)] is in F (U)
iff #T (n) is in F (U) for every numeral n.
(r9) #[∀xT (x)] is in G(U) iff #T (n) is in G(U) for every numeral n, and #[∀xT (x)] is in
F (U) iff #T (n) is in F (U) at least for one numeral n.
Rules (r0)–(r9) and induction on the complexity of formulas determine uniquely subsets G(U)
and F (U) of D whenever U is a subset of D. Denote by LU the language formed by all those
sentences L whose Go¨del numbers are in G(U) or in F (U). LU contains by rule (r1) all
sentences of the base language L.
3
3 Fixed point results
We say that a subset U of D is consistent if for no sentence A of L the Go¨del numbers of both
A and ¬A are in U . For instance, the empty set ∅ is consistent. Let P denote the family of
all consistent subsets of the set D of Go¨del numbers of sentences of L.
The following three lemmas can be proved as the corresponding results in [11], replacing ’true
in M ’ by ’true in the interpretation of L’.
Lemma 3.1. ([11, Lemma 2.1]) If U ∈ P, then G(U) ∈ P, F (U) ∈ P, and G(U)∩F (U) = ∅.
According to Lemma 3.1 the mapping G := U 7→ G(U) maps P into P. Assuming that P is
ordered by inclusion, we have the following result.
Lemma 3.2. ([11, Lemma 4.2]) G is order preserving in P, i.e., G(U) ⊆ G(V ) whenever U
and V are sets of P and U ⊆ V .
Lemma 3.3. ([11, Lemma 4.3]) If W is a chain in P, then ∪W = ∪{U | U ∈ W} is in P.
Fixed points of the set mapping G := U 7→ G(U) from P to P, i.e., those U ∈ P for which
U = G(U), have a central role in the formulation of MTT. In the formulation our main fixed
point theorem we use transfinite sequences of P indexed by von Neumann ordinals. Such a
sequence (Uλ)λ∈α of P is said to be strictly increasing if Uµ ⊂ Uν whenever µ ∈ ν ∈ α. A set
V of P is called sound iff V ⊆ G(V ).
The following fixed point theorem is proved in [11].
Theorem 3.1. ([11, Theorem 4.1]) If V ∈ P is sound, then there exists the smallest of those
consistent fixed points of G which contain V . This fixed point is the last member of the union
of those transfinite sequences (Uλ)λ∈α of P which satisfy
(C) (Uλ)λ∈α is strictly increasing, U0 = V , and if 0 ∈ µ ∈ α, then Uµ =
⋃
λ∈µ
G(Uλ).
As a consequence of Theorem 3.1 we obtain.
Corollary 3.1. Let W be the set of Go¨del numbers of all those sentences of L which are true
in its interpretation, and let V be any subset of W .
(a) V is a sound and consistent subset of D.
(b) The union of the transfinite sequences which satisfy (C) is the smallest consistent fixed
point of G.
Proof. (a) Rule (r1) and Lemma 3.2 imply that V ⊆ G(∅) ⊆ G(V ), so that V is sound. It is
also consistent, as a subset of a consistent set G(∅).
(b) V is by (a) sound and consistent. If U is a consistent fixed point of G, then V ⊆ G(∅) ⊂
G(U) = U . Thus V is contained in every consistent fixed point of G. By Theorem 3.1, the
union of those transfinite sequences (Uλ)λ∈α of P which satisfy (C) is the smallest consistent
fixed point of G that contains V . This proves (b).
Remarks 3.1. The smallest members of (Uλ)λ∈α satisfying (C) are n-fold iterations Un =
Gn(V ), n ∈ N = {0, 1, . . . }. If they form a strictly increasing sequence, the next member Uω
is their union, Uω+n = G
n(Uω), n ∈ N, and so on.
4
4 A mathematical theory of truth
Recall that D denotes the set of Go¨del numbers of sentences of the language L. Given a
subset U of D, let G(U) and F (U) be the subsets of D constructed in Section 3. In the
next definition, which is the same as presented in [11] in a special case, we formulate our
mathematical theory of truth (shortly MTT).
Definition 4.1. Assume that U is a consistent subset of D, and that U = G(U). Denote by
LU the language containing those sentences A of L for which #A is in G(U) or in F (U). A
sentence A of LU is interpreted as true iff #A is in G(U), and as false iff #A is in F (U). T
is called a truth predicate for LU .
In view of Definition 4.1, ‘#A is in G(U)’ can be replaced by ‘A is true’ and ‘#A is in F (U)’
by ‘A is false’ in (r1)–(r9). This replacement, the construction of G(U) and F (U) and Lemma
3.1 imply that LU is an MA language, having thus those syntactical and semantical properties
which are assumed for the base language L.
The following result justifies to call T as a truth predicate of LU .
Lemma 4.1. If U is a consistent subset of D, and if U = G(U), then T -biconditionality:
A↔ T (⌈A⌉) is true, and A↔ ¬T (⌈A⌉) is false for every sentence A of LU .
Proof. Assume that U ⊂ D is consistent, and that U = G(U). Let A be a sentence of LU .
Applying rules (r2) and (r3), and the assumption U = G(U), we obtain
– #A is in G(U) iff #A is in U iff #T (⌈A⌉) is in G(U) iff #¬T (⌈A⌉) is in F (U);
– #A is in F (U) iff #[¬A] is in G(U) iff #[¬A] is in U iff #T (⌈A⌉) is in F (U) iff #¬T (⌈A⌉)
is in G(U).
The above results, rule (r7) and Definition 4.1 imply that A ↔ T (⌈A⌉) is true, and that
A↔ ¬T (⌈A⌉) is false. This holds for every sentence A of LU .
Our main result on the connection between the valuations determined by the interpretation
of L and that of LU defined in Definition 4.1 reads as follows:
Lemma 4.2. Let U be a consistent fixed point of G. If A is a sentence of L, then either
(a) A is true in the interpretation of L, iff A is true, iff T (⌈A⌉) is true, or
(b) A is false in the interpretation of L, iff A is false, iff T (⌈A⌉) is false.
Proof. Assume that A is a sentence of L. Because L is completely interpreted, then A is
either true or false in the interpretation of L.
– A is true in the interpretation of L iff #A is in G(U), by rule (r1), iff #A is in U , because
U = G(U), iff #T (⌈A⌉) is in G(U) by rule (r2), iff T (⌈A⌉) is true, by Definition 4.1.
– A is false in the interpretation of L iff ¬A is true in the interpretation of L iff #[¬A] is in
G(U), by rule (r1), iff #[¬A] is in U , because U = G(U), iff #T (⌈A⌉) is in F (U), by rule
(r2), iff T (⌈A⌉) is false, by Definition 4.1.
Consequently, a sentence A of L is true in the interpretation of L iff T (⌈A⌉) is true, and false
in the interpretation of L iff T (⌈A⌉) is false. These results and the result of Lemma 4.1 imply
the conclusions (a) and (b).
5
5 On the Regress Problem
First of ten theses presented in [1, p. 6] is: “The Regress Problem is a real problem for
epistemology.” We are going to study the regress problem in the framework of MTT. We
adjust first our terminology to that used in [22] in the study of the regress problem. Given
an MA language L, let an MA language LU that contains L be determined by Definition 4.1,
U being the smallest fixed point of G. By statements we mean the sentences of LU , which
are valued by Definition 4.1. A statement A is said to entail B, if it is not possible that A
is true and B is false simultaneously. For instance, if A → B is true, then A entails B. We
say that a statement A justifies a statement B if A confirms the truth of B. For instance, if
A↔ ¬B is true, then A justifies B iff A is false. If A→ B is true, then A justifies B iff A is
true (Modus Ponens). A is called contingent if the truth value of A is unknown.
Consider an infinite regress
. . . Fi, . . . , F1, F0 (5.1)
of statements Fi, i ≥ 0, where the statement F0 is contingent. We shall impose the following
conditions on statements Fi, i > 0 (cf. [22]):
(i) Fi entails Fi−1;
(ii) F0 ∨ · · · ∨ Fi−1 does not entail Fi;
(iii) F0 ∨ · · · ∨ Fi−1 does not justify Fi.
Regress (5.1) is called justification-saturated if the following condition holds:
(iv) . . . what justifies Fi−1 is Fi, . . . , what justifies F1 is F2, what justifies F0 is F1.
Lemma 5.1. Assume that in regress (5.1) the statement F0 is contingent, and that the state-
ments Fi, i > 0, satisfy conditions (i)–(iii).
(a) If F1 is false, then Fi is false for each i > 0. F0 is justified iff F0 ↔ ¬F1 is true.
(b) If Fn is true for some n > 0, then Fi is true when 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
(c) The regress (5.1) is justification saturated iff Fi is true for all i > 0, in which case F0 is
justified.
Proof. (a) Assume that F1 is false. If Fi would be true for some i > 1, there would be the
smallest such an i. Then Fi−1 would be true by (i). Replacing i by i − 1, and so on, this
reasoning would imply after i− 1 steps that F1 is true; a contradiction. Thus all statements
Fi, i > 0, are false. Because F1 is false, it confirms the truth of F0 iff F0 and ¬F1 have same
truth values iff F0 ↔ ¬F1 is true.
(b) Assume that Fn is true for some n > 0. Since Fi entails Fi−1, i = n, n− 1, . . . , 1, then Fi
is true for every i = n− 1, . . . , 0.
(c) If Fn is false for some n > 0, then Fn+1 is false by property (i), and it does not justify Fn,
so that condition (iv) is not valid. On the other hand, condition (i) ensures that condition
(iv) is valid if Fi is true for all i > 0. In this case F1 justifies F0, i.e., F0 is true.
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Example 5.1. Let L be the first-order language L = {∈} of set theory, and M the minimal
model of ZF set theory constructed in [3]. M is countable and contains the set ω of natural
numbers and their set S(ω) = ω ∪ {ω} (cf. [3, 14]). We assume that numerals are defined in
L, e.g., as in [6]. Interpret a sentence A of L as true in L if M |=A, and false in L if M |=¬A,
in the sense defined in [17, II.2.7 and p. 237]. By [17, Lemma II.2.8.22] this interpretation
makes L fully interpreted. In particular, L is an MA language. Choose L as the base language
of theory MTT. Equip S(ω) with the natural ordering < of natural numbers plus n < ω for
every natural number n. If Z denotes a nonempty subset of S(ω), it is easy to verify that the
infinite regress (5.1) of statements
Fi : i < β, for every β ∈ Z, i = 0, 1, . . . , (5.2)
satisfy conditions (i)–(iii), and that F0 is contingent. Moreover, condition (iv) is valid by
Lemma 5.1 if and only if Fi is true for all i > 0. This holds if and only if Z = {ω}.
6 Remarks
The main purpose of this paper is to present a mathematical theory of truth (MTT) for a
class languages which are formal enough for mathematical reasoning.
To describe properties of MTT and to compare it to some other theories of truth, let S =
(L,Σ) be a mathematical theory, where L is a first-order formal language, and Σ is a set
of axioms. Assume that Σ is consistent, and is either an extension of Robinson arithmetic
Q (e.g., Q itself or Peano arithmetic, L being the language of arithmetic), or Q can be
interpreted in Σ (e.g., Σ axiomatizes ZF set theory, and L is the language of set theory).
By Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem that theory has a countable model M . Interpret a sentence
A of L as true in L if M |=A, and false in L if M |=¬A, in the sense defined in [17, II.2.7].
By [17, Lemma II.2.8.22] this interpretation makes L fully interpreted, and L is an MA
language. Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem (cf. [25]) implies that L cannot contain it’s truth
predicate, yielding ‘Tarski’s Commandment’ (cf. [19]). Let L be a formal language obtained
by augmenting L with a monadic predicate T . T cannot be a truth predicate of L, for
otherwise one could construct a Liar sentence, which implies the ‘Liar paradox’ (cf. [12]).
Thus L does not contain its truth predicate, either. Many axiomatic theories of truth (cf.,
e.g, [5]) are constructed for languages which contain a Liar sentence or are subject to the
’Revenge of Liar’. Such languages are not MA languages.
Theory MTT provides an alternative. Given an MA language L, let LU , where U is a
consistent fixed point of G, be an extension of L constructed in Section 3. That construction
and the interpretation given for LU in Definition 4.1 makes it an MA language. Moreover,
LU contains by Definition 4.1 a truth predicate T . It follows from Lemma 4.1 that there is no
Liar sentence in LU . As an MA language LU is formal enough for mathematical reasoning.
In particular, the language L of the above theory S is extended in SU =(LU ,MTT) to an MA
language LU that contains its truth predicate and is free from paradoxes.
If S = (L,Σ) is as above, L contains by Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem a true arith-
metical sentence, say B, that is not provable from the axioms of Σ (cf. [24]). By Lemma
4.2 both B and T (B) are true in the interpretation of LU . Based on the existence of B
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the following opinions on mathematical truth presented in [21, Chapter 4]: “The notion of
mathematical truth goes beyond the whole concept of formalism. There is something abso-
lute and ‘God-given’ about mathematical truth. Real mathematical truth goes beyond mere
man-made constructions.” These opinions are questioned because of the assumption that Σ is
consistent. (cf. [24]). Despite inability of human mind to see that consistency it is indispens-
able for reliability mathematical results. Mathematics rests on the belief that its theories are
consistent.
MTT has properties that conform well with the eight norms formulated in [18] for theories of
truth. Truth is expressed by a predicate T . An MA language LU contains a syntax of first-
order logic with equality, natural numbers as constants and numerals as terms. It is closed
under logical connectives and quantifiers. A theory of truth is added to the base language
L. If the interpretation of L is determined by a consistent mathematical theory (Peano
arithmetic, ZF set theory, e.t.c.), then MTT proves the theory in question true, by Lemma
4.2. Truth predicate T is not subject to any restrictions within a fixed point language LU .
T -biconditional is derivable unrestrictedly within a fixed point language LU , by the proof of
Lemma 4.1. Truth is compositional, by Definition 4.1 and rules (r3)–(r9). The theory allows
for standard interpretations if the interpretation of L is standard. In particular, the outer
logic and the inner logic coincide, and they are classical.
Paradoxes led Zermelo to axiomatize set theory. To avoid paradoxes Tarski “excluded all
Liar-like sentences from being well-formed”, as noticed in [18]. A fixed point language LU
does not contain such sentences in the theory MTT. In particular, MTT is immune to ‘Tarski’s
Commandment’ (cf. [19]), to Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem (cf. [25]), to ‘Tarskian hierar-
chies’ (cf. [8]), and to ‘Liar paradox’ (cf. [12]). The smallest of those languages for which
MTT is formulated is LU , where U is the smallest consistent fixed point of G. It relates to
that of the grounded sentences defined in [10, 16] when L is the language of arithmetic. See
also [7], where considerations are restricted to signed statements.
A base language L can contain more sentences than first-order formal languages, thus extend-
ing the class of languages for which theories of truth are usually formulated.
Another purpose of the presented theory of truth is to establish a proper framework to study
the regress problem. Tarski’s theory of truth (cf. [25]) does not offer it because that theory
itself is not free from infinite regress. According to [20, p.189]: “the most important problem
with a Tarskian truth predicate is its demand for a hierarchy of languages. ... within that
hierarchy of languages, we cannot seem to have any valid method of ending the regression to
introduce the “basic” metalanguage.”
Kripke’s theory of truth is also a problematic framework because of three-valued inner logic.
As stated in [18, p.283]: “Classical first-order logic is certainly the default choice for any
selection among logical systems. It is presupposed by standard mathematics, by (at least)
huge parts of science, and by much of philosophical reasoning.” Moreover, T -biconditionality
rule does not hold in Kripke’s theory of truth because of paradoxical sentences.
Example 5.1 is inconsistent with the conclusion of [23] cited in the Introduction. In this
example the property that regress (5.1) is justification-saturated both implies and is implied
by truth of a ’foundational’ statement Fb : Z = {ω}. Thus it does not support the form
of infinitism presented in [15]: “infinitism holds that there are no ultimate, foundational
reasons”. Pure infinite regress is even refused in [4, p.13]. On the other hand, it supports
8
“impure” infinitism and the form of foundationalism presented in [1, 26].
Example 5.1 implies that the proofs in [22, 23] to the assertion that “any version of Principle
of Sufficient Reason is false” are based on the questionable premise that infinite regresses of
justifications don’t exist. In fact, this example gives some support to Principles of Sufficient
Reason, as well as to many other arguments whose validity is questioned in [22, 23]. For
instance, in the ‘universe’ S(ω) of Example 5.1,
• {ω} provides a sufficient reason for F0;
• {ω} affords an ultimate and foundational reason that justifies F0;
• {ω} is the final explainer of F0;
• {ω} gives the first cause that makes regress (5.1),(5.2) justification-saturated;
• ω explains the existence of the ’universe’ N of natural numbers (N = ω by [13]);
• ω and {ω} explain the existence of the ‘universe’ S(ω) (S(ω) = ω ∪ {ω} by [13]);
• ω is something beyond natural numbers;
• ω is infinite and greatest in the ‘universe’ S(ω);
• ω is ‘self-justified’ (The Axiom of Infinity).
Belief that ω exists is a matter of faith. In Example 5.1 we have assumed it because the
model M of ZF set theory contains the set ω ∪ {ω}. Notice that this set does not belong to
the standard model of arithmetic. Thus MTT, where the base language L is the language of
arithmetic, is not a sufficient framework for Example 5.1.
Acknowledgments: The author is indebted to Ph.d. Markus Pantsar for valuable discus-
sions on the subject.
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